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ABSTRACT 
The Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) provides a distributed multilevel 
secure (MLS) environment consisting of a MLS local area network (LAN) and 
multiple single-level networks. The MYSEA server enforces a mandatory access 
control policy to ensure that users can only access data for which they are 
authorized. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) placed on a single-level network 
can store the alerts in the IDS databases at the same classification level as the 
network being monitored. As most databases do not support the enforcement of 
mandatory security policies, access to these databases is restricted to single-
level access only. Thus, administrators are not presented with a coherent view of 
IDS alerts from all of the connected networks. 
 The objective of this thesis is to design a database proxy to allow 
administrators to view and analyze IDS information at multiple classification 
levels while enforcing the systems overall mandatory policy. Based on the 
derived concept of operations and the requirements, a design for the database 
proxy that mediates access to databases at different levels was conceived. A 
prototype database proxy was implemented along with modifications to a web-
based analysis tool to allow the viewing and analysis of IDS information at 
multiple classification levels. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MOTIVATION 
Most databases are typically untrusted and do not support the 
enforcement of mandatory security policies. Once a connection has been 
established to a database, a user is allowed to read and write to it. For multilevel 
secure (MLS) systems that implement the Bell-LaPadula (BLP) security model 
[1], this behavior presents an access control problem. Specifically, the user is 
allowed to read data classified at and below his security level (no read-up). 
However, he is only allowed to write data at his security level and above it (no 
write-down). This presents a problem because once a user connects to a 
database classified below his security level, he has both read and write access. 
This is inconsistent with the BLP security model that is implemented in the 
MYSEA environment [2]. 
The Intrusion Detection System (IDS) in the MYSEA environment is 
deployed on multiple single-level networks. When Snort, which is IDS used in the 
MYSEA environment, raises an alert about a possible intrusion, a database client 
will write the alert into the database with the confidentiality level that is the same 
as that of the network.  The Basic Security Analysis Tool (BASE), an open 
source web-based application, is then used to analyze the IDS data in the 
database [3].  As currently organized, both read and write access to the database 
that stores the intrusion detection records is required. This means that each 
instance of BASE is restricted to only read and analyze IDS data that is at its 
current level of confidentiality and not below it.  To provide a more coherent view 
of the collected IDS data, the current IDS implementation in MYSEA must be 
modified to allow a user to read IDS data at and below the user’s session level 
and to only write the consolidated IDS report at the current session level. 
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B. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The purpose of this thesis is to study and modify the existing MYSEA 
implementation to allow the BASE application read access to data that is 
classified below the level that the user is logged in. The following questions were 
examined in this thesis. 
1. Can a trusted mechanism be designed that will permit operators to 
read intrusion detection information at multiple classification levels 
while enforcing the system’s overall mandatory confidentiality policy? 
2. The SQL database allows both read and write access when 
connected. Can the designed trusted mechanism restrict write access 
when a user at a higher security level connects to a database of a 
lower security level? 
To provide a structured approach for this thesis, the following 
methodology is employed. The background of the existing implementation of the 
MYSEA environment is studied and components relating to this thesis are 
reviewed. The concept of operations and high-level requirements are developed 
to guide the design. This design is then implemented to demonstrate its proof of 
concept. The implementation is first conducted on a Linux-based system before 
porting it to the MYSEA server running on XTS400 system [4]. Testing 
methodologies are then employed in both developmental and acceptance testing 
phases to verify the correctness of the implementation. The results of this thesis 
project are intended allow the user logged in at a particular security level to read 
from an IDS database of a lower or equal security level while preventing write 
access to an IDS database of a lower security level. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter I presents the issues of accessing single-level databases in MLS 
systems, which provides the motivation and purpose of this thesis. 
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Chapter II provides some background information on the MYSEA 
environment, IDS, IDS analysis tools and SQL proxies, that forms the basis of 
this thesis. 
Chapter III discusses the concept of operations that lead to the functional 
requirements and the design of the database proxy prototype and the modified 
IDS analysis tool, the Basic Analysis Security Engine (BASE). The selection 
process of the open source database proxy for this thesis is also presented. 
Chapter IV covers the implementation of the database proxy in two 
phases. Phase 1 was first done on a Fedora 12 Linux system to gain familiarity 
with the database proxy and to avoid issues with the STOP 7 operating system. 
Phase 2 followed with the implementation of the database proxy prototype and 
the modified BASE application on the XTS400 system running the STOP 7 
operating system. 
Chapter V describes the test plan for the implementation presented in 
Chapter IV and the corresponding test results. 
Chapter VI concludes the thesis with some possible future work on the 
IDS and database prototype and conclusion to the work done in this thesis. 
 4
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter contains background information on the Monterey Security 
Architecture (MYSEA), the Secure Trusted Operating Program (STOP) Version 
7, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and the Basic Analysis and Security Engine 
(BASE). 
A. MYSEA ENVIRONMENT OVERVIEW 
This section covers an overview of the MYSEA environment as well as the 
STOP 7 operating system, on which MYSEA runs. 
1. Overview 
MYSEA provides a distributed multilevel secure (MLS) operating 
environment for the enforcement of mandatory security policies. It supports both 
mandatory access control (MAC) and discretionary access control (DAC). It 
consists of high-assurance components, such as the XTS400, which executes 
the STOP operating system and low-assurance commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
products. Figure 1 shows the layout of the MYSEA environment. The highly 
trustworthy Trusted Path Extensions (TPEs) and Trusted Communications 
Modules (TCMs) provide authentication and disambiguation for users and single 
level networks [2]. The TPE provides the trusted path between the users and the 
MYSEA servers, and provides a gateway between the COTS clients and the 
trusted server, while the TCM mediates the access of single level networks to the 
MYSEA servers. To support complex and adaptive operational environments, 
dynamic changes to the security services may be required. As such, Dynamic 
Security Services (DSS) mechanisms in MYSEA allow the modification of 
protection attributes of IPSec tunnels and access to application services [5]. 
MYSEA relies on the XTS-400 trusted computing platform and the STOP 
operating system to enforce the mandatory confidentiality and integrity access 
control policies and in most cases, the discretionary policies as well. The MYSEA 
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effort includes the construction of middleware services to support application 
services and some of these middleware elements must be trusted. Application 
services do not enforce MAC policy, but are constrained by the STOP 
enforcement. However, some services, such as the Wiki [6], enforce the 
application-specific DAC policy. The MYSEA approach allows for the 
minimization of the number and the extent of trusted components to meet high 
assurance requirements. 
 
Figure 1.   MYSEA environment 
2. STOP 7 Operating System (OS) 
The STOP 7 OS is the operating system used to power the XTS-400 
trusted computing platform [4]. It enforces security policies based on the 
following access control models: role-based access control (RBAC), Bell-
LaPadula (BLP) confidentiality model, Biba integrity model. These policies can be 
used separately or together to enforce an enterprise security policy for data 
protection. The version 7 of STOP OS provides an improvement on its 
performance and flexibility over its previous versions.  
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STOP 7 contains an auditing and system logging feature called “SLOG” 
(System LOGger). This provides safeguards to minimize the loss of audit data in 
the event of a system failure. STOP 7 also has additional capabilities for 
cryptographic support and a stateful packet filtering firewall at the kernel-level. 
These features allow the system to support security policy objectives and to be 
deployed for use in networked environments. 
B. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS (IDS) 
This section provides an overview of IDS functionality and its limitations. 
Two open source IDSes, Snort and Suricata are also discussed. 
1. Overview of an IDS 
Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring and analyzing system 
behavior or traffic anomalies in the system or network for possible threats of 
violation of computer security policies. An IDS is a device or software application 
that performs this functionality by comparing the network traffic to known attack 
signatures. If an attack is detected, the IDS will raise an alarm by generating an 
alert. The IDS used in the MYSEA environment is Snort [7]. 
Two detection techniques are used by Snort to evaluate the network 
packets. The first technique is a signature-based detection method. Signatures 
are preconfigured and predetermined attack patterns based on unique lines of 
code or strings. The IDS raises an alarm if the network packet contains data that 
matches the signatures. These signatures have to be constantly updated to 
mitigate new and emerging threats. The second method is a statistical anomaly-
based detection technique. Normal acceptable network traffic behavior is 
evaluated and a baseline of normal activity is created. Any network traffic that 
performs outside of this baseline is considered a possible attack and generates 
an alert. 
Both techniques have limitations and are susceptible to false positives and 
false negatives. A false positive occurs when the IDS raises an alarm when no 
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attack has taken place. In signature-based IDS, this may occur due to poorly 
designed signatures. In anomaly-based IDS, this may be due to the inability to 
provide a consistent performance baseline. A false negative occurs when an 
actual attack has taken place but the IDS does not generate any alert. For a 
signature-based IDS, this occurs when the signature for the attack is absent and 
it can be mitigated by constantly updating the attack signatures. For anomaly-
based IDS, a false negative occurs if the intrusion activity is similar to normal 
acceptable network traffic behavior. Other than testing the attacks against the 
baseline profile and adjusting the baseline, it is difficult to mitigate the false 
negatives for anomaly-based IDS. 
The alerts generated by the IDS sensors are usually stored in flat log files 
by default. These log files could potentially store millions of entries, which would 
overwhelm the analyst performing the analysis. To overcome this problem, the 
alerts are often stored in a central repository using relational databases such as 
PostgreSQL or Microsoft MSSQL. Using relational databases makes it easier to 
manipulate the data for analysis. In addition, the database products are usually 
packages with management tools for replication, backup and recovery. 
The next two sections provide a discussion of two IDSes: Snort and 
Suricata. Snort currently is used in the MYSEA environment and has been 
available for about 12 years. Suricata is a relatively new open source project that 
aims to replace Snort as the IDS of choice. 
2. Snort 
Snort [7] is an open source network intrusion prevention and detection 
system. An intrusion detection and prevention system (IDPS) is similar to an IDS 
except that it is usually placed inline, as shown in Figure 2, and has the ability to 
block detected incoming attacks. An inline IPS device usually sits in between the 
network and the firewall. All packets entering and leaving the network will pass 
through the IPS. Hence, the IPS is able to block detected incoming threats. An 
IDS sits offline between the network and the firewall. The packets do not go 
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through the IDS device. Hence, it is able to monitor and send out alerts if threats 
are detected, but not block them. Snort was created by Martin Roesh as a packet 
sniffer tool in 1998 [8]. It is now open source software and supported by Roesh’s 
company, Sourcefire. 
 
Figure 2.   IPS and IDS placement 
Snort’s threat prevention components consist of a packet classifier, an IP 
defragmenter and a TCP reassembler, a portscan processor and a detection 
engine [9]. The packet classifier determines which packets are inspected. The IP 
defragmenter and TCP reassembler ensure that the packets are inspected in the 
correct order. The portscan processor watches for portscans and the detection 
engine performs protocol normalization, rule matching, and other detection 
functions to identify threats. 
When Snort detects a threat, it will write an alert to an alert log by default. 
This alert logging can be configured to write to a syslog process or to a relational 
database such as PostgreSQL or Windows MSSQL Server. It can also be 
customized to write to unsupported databases or file formats. 
3. Suricata 
Suricata [10] is an open source IDS that provides support for the utilization 
of Snort’s attack signatures.  It was developed by the Open Information Security 
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Foundation (OISF) and a beta version was released on 31 December 2009. An 
advantage it has over Snort is that it supports multi-threading, which allows it to 
concurrently inspect multiple network packets. This improves the chances of 
detecting attack traffic. However, Suricata is still in the early phases of 
development and its performance is still slower than that of Snort [10]. Currently, 
it supports only a subset of the functionality offered by Snort. As such, Snort 
remains the choice of IDS for the MYSEA environment. 
C. IDS ANALYSIS TOOLS 
1. Overview of IDS Analysis Tools 
IDSs tend to generate large volumes of log data for the alerts detected in 
the network. These log data allow analysts to understand the threats to the 
network and to provide a better defense of their systems. However, the huge 
volume of log data generated means that the analyst has to spend a large 
amount of time sifting through the individual records to identify the threats and 
attacks. IDS analysis tools help to alleviate this problem by automating some of 
the log analysis. The analysis tool used in the MYSEA environment is the Basic 
Analysis and Security Engine (BASE). 
2. Basic Security Analysis Engine (BASE) 
BASE [11] is a web-based interface written in PHP to analyze intrusions 
detected by the Snort IDS System. It is also able to search and process 
databases containing security events logged by different network monitoring 
tools. BASE has the ability to graphically display both Layer-3 (network) and 
Layer-4 (transport) data. Using parameters such as time, protocol, and 
classification, graphs and statistics can be generated and displayed. 
The latest version of BASE (version 1.4.5) does not have any new 
features compared to the version (version 1.4.0) currently used in the MYSEA 
environment. However, there have been some security updates and bug fixes 
since the last version used in MYSEA. Currently, BASE is unable to display data 
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from multiple databases in a single web browser instance. Multiple browser 
instances have to be used to inspect and analyze information from multiple 
databases. 
Development for BASE 2 has also started on 13 Aug 2010 [12]. It is based 
on the code from BASE 1.x and Analysis Console from Intrusion Databases 
project. This application will be able to analyze the alerts from a Snort or Suricata 
IDS system.  
D. SQL PROXIES 
The database used for MYSEA is PostgreSQL. The design presented in 
this work will use a SQL proxy. This section introduces SQL proxies and a 
particular proxy, PGPool-II. 
1. Overview of SQL Proxies 
SQL proxy services are processes that act as an intermediary between 
clients and SQL databases. SQL proxy services are able to accept requests from 
multiple clients, and forward them to the SQL servers. By doing so, all service 
requests to the database appear to come from a single source. There are various 
proxies, which perform different functions. For this project, PGPool-II will be used 
as the database proxy and will be modified to become MLS aware. The reasons 
for which PGPool-II was chosen are analyzed in the next chapter. 
2. PGPool-II 
PGPool-II is a proxy service that works between PostgreSQL servers and 
a PostgreSQL database client [13]. In addition to forwarding requests, it also 





Connection Pooling PGPool-II saves connections to the PostgreSQL servers 
and reuses them whenever a connection with the same 
properties is requested. This reduces the connection 
overhead. 
Replication PGPool-II performs replication by creating a real-time 
backup on two or more physical disks. This ensures that 
the service can still continue in the event of disk failure. 
Load Balancing PGPool-II utilizes the replication feature to reduce the 
load on each PostgreSQL server. This is done by 
distributing the SELECT queries among multiple 
servers, improving throughput. 
Parallel Query In this mode, data is distributed among multiple servers, 
so that a single query can be executed on all servers 
concurrently to reduce the overall execution time. A 
separate database is required to store the rules on how 
the data is distributed among the servers. 
 
Table 1.   PGPool-II features. From [13] 
For this project, only the request-forwarding feature of the proxy is 
required. However, it is anticipated that the features described in Table 1 will be 
utilized to support federated database services in subsequent MYSEA releases.  
3. SQL Relay and PL/Proxy 
SQL Relay is a database proxy that provides persistent connection 
pooling, proxying and load balancing on Linux and Unix systems [14]. It provides 
services to speed up and enhance the scalability of database-driven web-based 
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applications, distributing accessing to replicated databases and migrating 
applications from one database to another. 
PL/Proxy [15] is a database proxy that partitions databases and distributes 
the data across the partitions. Because the data is distributed, queries can be 
performed in parallel on several partitions to reduce the overall execution time.  
Both proxies were evaluated together with PGPool-II for the purpose of 
this thesis. The selection criteria and outcome are described in Section E of 
Chapter III. 
E. SUMMARY 
Databases are not designed to support MLS systems, as the user is 
allowed to both read and write once a connection is made. As such, database 
proxies are required to mediate the connection between the user and the 
database. The next chapter will cover the concept of operation, requirements and 
design to illustrate the use of BASE and database proxies to mediate access to 
the IDS databases. 
 14
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III. REQUIREMENTS AND DESIGN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will cover the concept of operations for a system that uses a 
database proxy to mediate the read and write operations to multiple IDS 
databases, each of which contains information at a different confidentiality level.  
B. CONCEPT OF OPERATION 
1. Database Proxy 
The database proxy must operate in a way that does not violate the 
intended system policy. The intention of the database proxy is to allow a client to 
read IDS data stored at security levels that the current session level of the client 
dominates. It will also limit write access to only the security level that is equal to 
the current session level. This will align the access policy of the databases with 
the mandatory security policy enforced by STOP. 
The BASE-native SQL client application will first send a SQL query to the 
database proxy. The database proxy will then check the client’s current session 
level to determine if the requested query should be allowed. If the client’s current 
session level is equal to the security level of the database, then the client is 
allowed to write to and read from the database. If the client’s current session 
level is higher than the security level of the database, the client is only allowed to 
read from the database. The database proxy will allow this read-only functionality 
by filtering the SQL queries, and forwarding only the SELECT queries to the 
lower level databases. 
2. BASE 
BASE will be modified to allow the clients to decide which databases they 
want to access. However, only the allowable levels will be displayed to the users. 
For example, if the client is logged in at SIM_SECRET, then the option to access 
the SIM_SECRET or lower databases would be available. BASE will then 
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establish a connection to the databases through the respective database proxies. 




Figure 3.   Concept of operations 
BASE will also perform the consolidation of the reports if data from more 
than one database is requested. It will do this by first querying the databases 
through the respective database proxies, in the increasing order of security level. 
The results would be consolidated by appending them in the order of the query 
and displayed on the client. Each query must complete before the next query can 
be issued. 
An advisory label will be shown at the top of the clients’ display to inform 
the user of his current session level.  Labels will also be inserted at the start and 
end of the data at each different security level. This will allow the user to clearly 
distinguish information at different sensitivity levels. 
C. ARCHITECTURAL SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In the original IDS design [3], the session level of the user was transparent 
to BASE. It was only able to connect to the database with the security label equal 






















knowledge of the current session level and the databases it is allowed to access. 
Hence, some new threats to the system have to be addressed. 
If the system was compromised, it might be possible for an adversary to 
modify BASE to access databases that have a higher security level than the 
current session level. Attempts to connect to those higher security level 
databases through the respective database proxies would be successful if the 
database proxy did not enforce the MAC policy. To mitigate this threat, the 
database proxy will check the current session against the security level of the 
database, and deny such attempts. 
Another possible situation that could arise is that the adversary learns 
about the existence of the database proxies. The adversary could then attempt to 
connect BASE directly to the databases. However, the IP address and TCP ports 
of the databases are configured for single level accesses only. For single level 
accesses, only applications of that particular security level would be able to gain 
access. As such, the adversary would not be able to gain access to databases 
that are not equal to the current session level. 
D. REQUIREMENTS 
This section will cover the requirements to construct a working prototype 
based on the concepts of operations discussed in Section B. 
1. Proxy Top-Level Requirements 
The database proxy has the following requirements: 
• The proxy shall only connect to the IDS database at the same security 
level at which the proxy runs. This connection shall be performed 
every time a query is requested from a SQL client application.  
• The proxy shall accept IDS queries from a SQL client application. 
• The proxy shall verify the security level of the client application prior to 
granting access to the IDS databases. 
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• The proxy shall allow the client application to query IDS data from the 
databases if the users’ session level dominates the security level of 
the databases. 
• The proxy shall deny the client application’s access to the database if 
the current session level is lower than the database it is trying to 
access. 
• If the current session level of the client application is higher than the 
security level of the database, the proxy shall filter the queries and 
only forward the queries starting with the word SELECT. A read query 
does not contain strings that will cause changes to the database. The 
filtering shall be done by parsing the first word in the query string to 
determine if it is associated with a read query. If no such word is 
found, it is considered a write and the query shall be dropped. 
• There shall be one instance of the database proxy per security level in 
the system. 
• The proxy shall keep a log of all requests. 
2. BASE Top-Level Requirements 
The BASE application has the following requirements: 
• BASE shall display the security levels of the databases that it is 
allowed to query based on the current session level. 
• If multiple databases are queried, BASE shall consolidate and display 
the results in a single web page. 
• BASE shall query the allowed IDS database on behalf of an 
authenticated user. 
• On the completion of a query, BASE shall close the connection 
request. 
• BASE shall run at the authenticated users’ session level. 
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There shall be at least one instance of the BASE application per client. 
E. DATABASE PROXY SELECTION CRITERIA 
To avoid building the database proxy from scratch, some open source 
options for the proxy were examined. The general requirements and selection 
criteria for the database proxy are discussed in this section. 
1. General Requirements 
The database proxy chosen must be able to mediate the connection and 
query requests between the client and the database server. As such, it must 
appear to the clients as the server and appear to the server as the client. 
2. Selection Criteria 
The selection criteria used to evaluate the database proxies are as 
follows: 
• Compatible with PostgreSQL: PostgreSQL is the database used in the 
MYSEA environment. As such, the database proxy must be able to 
support PostgreSQL. 
• Open source: Only open source database proxies will be considered 
for this thesis to avoid licensing costs. This is either a “Yes” or “No” 
criterion. 
• Platform compatibility: The database proxy should be compatible with 
popular Linux-based operating systems such as Fedora and Red Hat. 
It should also be compiled, installed and run on the STOP 7 operating 
system without requiring major changes. The ranking for platform 
compatibility is given below. 
a. Ranking Platform Compatibility 
1. Supports a minimal set of common operating systems 
2. Supports some common operating systems 
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3. Supports many common operating systems 
4. Supports most common operating systems 
• Minimality: The database proxy should contain the minimal 
functionality required to support the proxy requirements (see section 
D.1) without additional features that are not used by MYSEA. The 
ranking for proxy minimality is given below. 
b. Ranking of Proxy Minimality  
1. Contains the required functionality with many unnecessary 
features 
2. Contains the required functionality with some unnecessary 
features 
3. Contains the required functionality with no unnecessary features 
• User support and documentation: Open source programs are usually 
not very well documented. That will cause difficulties when setting up 
and configuring the database proxy. The ranking for the 
documentation is given below. 
c. Ranking Support and Documentation 
1. Very little documentation, no user forums, tutorials or examples 
2. Some documentation, has some user forums, no tutorials or 
examples 
3. Good documentation, has user forums, some tutorials or 
examples 
4. Good to excellent documentation, active user forums, several 
clear tutorials or examples 
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3. Selection Process 
Three open source database proxies were identified for use in the MYSEA 













PGPool-II 9 9 4 2 4 
SQL 
Relay 
9 9 4 1 4 
PL/Proxy 9 9 4 2 4 
 
Table 2.   Selection criteria for database proxy 
4. Selection Outcome 
All the database proxies in Table 2 meet the general requirements and are 
very close in the terms of their scores. However, while SQL Relay supports 
multiple databases including PostgreSQL, it is mainly intended to support the 
Oracle database. PGPool-II and PL/Proxy were both developed to support mainly 
the PostgreSQL database, which is used in MYSEA. The PGPool-II and 
PL/Proxy also have fewer features beyond those required for this thesis 
compared to SQL Relay. While PGPool-II has more unnecessary features than 
PL/Proxy for the purpose of this thesis, it is anticipated that these could be 
utilized to support federated database services in the future. Based on these 
considerations, PGPool-II is the choice for implementation as the database proxy 
in this project. 
F. DESIGN 
This section covers the high-level design of the multilevel database proxy 
using PGPool-II and the MLS-constrained BASE. 
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1. PGPool-II 
The “IDS read-down” concept of operations introduces a database proxy 
service into the MYSEA environment. For this project, the database proxy is 
implemented using the open source PGPool-II database middleware program. 
The modified PGPool-II will ensure enforcement of the mandatory policy by 
checking the current session level against the security level of the database each 
time an access is requested. It will also filter out the write requests if the current 
session level is not equal to the security level of the database. Figure 4 shows 
the implementation design with PGPool-II as the database proxy. 
 
Figure 4.   Database (PGPool-II) implementation design 
Whenever the user logged in at the SECRET level requests for 
SIM_SECRET data from the IDS databases, the following occurs: 
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1. The client sends a request to the TPE. 
2. The request is sent through the TPE to the Secure Session Server 
(SSS) Parent. 
3. The SSS Parent first checks if the requesting client has an established 
session by searching for a matching entry in the User Database. If no 
entry is found, it then checks for a valid connection request by a 
remote application in the MYSEA Remote Connections Database. If 
the request is associated in either one of the two databases, an SSS 
Child is then spawned to handle the request. 
4. The SSS Child then launches the Web Server, which runs at the 
current session level of the user or remote application. 
5. The client invokes BASE through the TPE. 
6. The SSS Child passes the request to the web server, which then 
executes BASE. 
7. As BASE is untrusted, it is not given access to the MLS interface and 
must rely on the SSS Child that spawned it to make socket calls on its 
behalf. Hence, BASE requests for connection and queries to the 
PGPool-II (SIM_SECRET) proxy go through the SSS Child. 
8. The SSS Child then establishes a connection to PGPool-II 
(SIM_SECRET) on the behalf of BASE and forwards all the connection 
requests and queries to PGPool-II (SIM_SECRET). 
9. PGPool-II (SIM_SECRET) will then contact the Remote Connection 
database to perform a check to determine the session level associated 
with the request. Once the session level associated with the request is 
determined, PGPool-II (SIM_SECRET) will then compare the current 
session level against the security level of the requested IDS database. 
If the user’s current session level dominates the security level of the 
IDS database, PGPool-II (SIM_SECRET) will allow the connection and 
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all read queries. If the users’ session level equals the security level of 
the IDS database, it will allow all the write queries as well. Otherwise, 
the connection and all queries to the database will be denied. The 
queries are determined to be read queries if the strings within the 
queries start with the word “SELECT.” Otherwise, they would be 
considered as write queries. 
10. PGPool-II performs the connection and forwards the queries to the IDS 
database. 
11. The IDS database returns the query result to PGPool-II 
(SIM_SECRET). 
12. PGPool-II (SIM_SECRET) forwards the result back to the SSS. 
13. The SSS Child, in turn, forwards the result to BASE for it to process. 
14. BASE formats the results for display and returns the result to the SSS 
Child, after which, BASE will issue a request through the SSS to 
terminate the connection to the database. 
15. The SSS Child will forward the formatted results back to the client 
through the TPE. 
BASE will disconnect from the IDS database before connecting to another 
IDS database. This is done after step 14 and before step 15. The steps are 
displayed in triangles in Figure 4. 
1. BASE will send a close connection request to the SSS. 
2. The SSS will then forward it to PGPool-II (SIM_SECRET) 
3. PGPool-II (SIM_SECRET) will forward it to the database to terminate 
the connection. 
If access to a database with a security level lower than the current session 
level is requested (i.e., SIM_UNCLASSIFIED) from the same BASE session, 
steps 4 through 14 would be repeated. The difference is that the SSS child will 
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establish a connection to PGPool-II (SIM_UNCLASSIFIED) and PGPool-II 
(SIM_UNCLASSIFIED) will mediate all access to the database after that. The 
checks performed by PGPool-II (SIM_UNCLASSIFIED) in step 9 should result in 
allowing the connection to the database that PGPool-II (SIM_UNCLASSIFIED) 
manages and only read queries. 
2. BASE 
To support the changes made to the “IDS read-down” concept of 
operations, BASE has to be modified. The user should be able to view SQL 
databases at his current session level and choose the security level of the 
database he wants to view. If the user selects databases of different levels, the 
data will be displayed in ascending order of security levels. Figure 5 displays the 
new user interface design. 
 
Figure 5.   New user interface design 
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The circled region numbered 1 shows the current session level of the 
user. This information is obtained by executing a STOP system call to obtain the 
security level of the process that is serving BASE. Previously, there was no 
information regarding the session level of the user. The SQL database at the 
current session level is automatically queried and displayed after a successful 
BASE login. The circled region numbered 2 displays the security levels of the 
databases available to the user. Only security levels dominated by the current 
session level will be displayed. The circled region numbered 3 displays the 
security level of the data displayed below it. Figure 6 shows how the data is 
displayed if multiple security levels are selected. There are labels displayed at 
the beginning and end of each section to mark the start and end of information at 
a particular security level. 
 
Figure 6.   Design of BASE displaying data with two security levels 
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G. SUMMARY 
The requirements analysis and design described in this chapter provide 
the supporting architecture for the implementation of the read-down and no write-
down policy for databases. The no read-up policy is enforced by the STOP OS. A 
prototype for the project was implemented based on these requirements and the 








This chapter covers the implementation of the prototype as a proof-of-
concept for the “IDS read-down” support for the MYSEA environment. The 
prototype is composed of a modified PGPool-II middleware program as the 
database proxy and a modified BASE application. 
B. DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT 
The development of the prototype took place in two phases. The first 
phase was done on the Fedora 12 Linux operating system. The reason for 
performing the first phase on Fedora 12 was to gain familiarity with PGPool-II. 
This allowed possible problems associated with running PGPool-II on the STOP 
7 OS to be avoided. For example, PGPool-II requires certain standard Linux 
functions (e.g., getuid()), which are not available in the STOP 7 OS environment.  
In the first phase, PGPool-II was installed and configured to connect to 
two IDS databases with notational security levels SIM_UNCLASSIFIED and 
SIM_SECRET. A PostgreSQL client test program, psql, which is packaged with 
the PostgreSQL distribution, was used to test the connection with the two 
databases. 
The second phase of the development was performed on the STOP 7 
operating system. In this phase, the PGPool-II program was modified to be 
session-level-aware. The BASE application was also modified to support 
connections to multiple databases by using PGPool-II as the database proxy. 
C. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS 
This section covers the details of PGPool-II implementation on the Fedora 
12 and MYSEA operating environment. The implementation details for the BASE 
application on the MYSEA operating environment are also discussed. 
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1. PGPool-II on Fedora 12 
PGPool-II requires that PostgreSQL libraries be installed. A copy of 
PostgreSQL 8.4.4 was obtained from www.postgres.org and installed. No 
configuration of the PostgreSQL 8.4.4 database is required, as only the library 
files are needed. Once the PostgreSQL libraries were installed, the installation of 
PGPool II can proceed. PGPool-II can be obtained from 
pgfoundry.org/projects/pgpool/. The detailed installation procedures for PGPool-II 
on the Fedora 12 operating system are covered in Appendix A. 
The system was then set up as shown in Figure 7. Two instances of 
PGPool-II were run using different configurations. One instance was configured 
to connect to the SIM_SECRET database on the STOP 7 operating system while 
the other instance was configured to connect to the SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
database.  
 
Figure 7.   System setup with Fedora 12 
The psql application, which was included in the PostgreSQL installation, 
was used to determine if the connection to the databases through the two  
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instances of PGPool-II worked. The psql application is a console-based front-end 
to PostgreSQL. It allows queries to be issued interactively to PostgreSQL, and 
obtains the results of those queries.  
The psql application was connected to both instances of PGPool-II at the 
same IP address but different ports. In this configuration, queries made through 
PGPool at port 9998 would return results from the SECRET database, whereas 
queries made at port 9999 would return results from the UNCLASSIFIED 
database. 
2. PGPool-II on MYSEA 
PGPool-II was modified to be able to work as a database proxy as 
described in Chapter III. It has to be aware of the security level of the IDS 
database that it is serving, be able to know if the client’s session level dominates 
the IDS database’s level, and has to deny all write requests if the client’s session 
level is not equal its session level. It also has to deny the connection if the IDS 
database’s security level is higher than the client’s session level. Modifications to 
the PGPool-II code for its start-up, connection and query requests processing 
were added. 
Figure 8 shows the modification made to PGPool-II upon start up. The 
shaded boxes shows the added functionality for MYSEA. On start up, PGPool-II 
is invoked with a parameter specifying the security level of the IDS database.  It 
then initializes access to the Remote Connection Module Database. If to the 
initialization sequence is successful, the PGPool-II proxy continues its normal 
execution. Otherwise, the PGPool-II proxy will terminate immediately. 
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Figure 8.   PGPool-II startup 
Figure 9 shows the modified flow diagram to reflect the changes to 
PGPool-II during its connection processing. The shaded regions are the new 
additions to the PGPool-II application. PGPool-II will now check if the request is 
registered in the Remote Connection Database. If it is not, PGPool-II will deny 
the connection request to the database and resume listening for connections. If it 
is registered, PGPool-II will perform the connection to the database and start 
listening for queries. 
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Figure 9.   PGPool-II to database connection 
The last modification to PGPool-II changes its handling of query requests. 




Figure 10.   PGPool-II query request 
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On receiving a query request, PGPool-II will first check if the user’s current 
session level dominates the security level of the database. If it does not, the 
query will be denied. If it does, PGPool-II will then check if the session level 
equals the security level of the database. If they are equal, the query will be 
forwarded to the database. Otherwise, PGPool-II checks if the request is a 
SELECT query. If it is a SELECT query, the query will be sent to the database. 
Otherwise, the query will be denied. 
3. BASE on STOP 7 
The BASE application was modified in order to support the “read-down” 
concept of operations needed for MYSEA. Headers have been added to the 
display to indicate the current session level and allowable display levels as 
shown in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11.   BASE header display 
The other major modifications to the BASE application are as follows: 
• The configuration file includes an array of two entries of advisory 
label information: one for SIM_UNCLASSIFIED and the other for 
SIM_SECRET. Only two entries are used for the purpose of the 
demonstration; more can be added in the future. Each entry is a 
structure consisting of the security level, binary representation of the 
label, IP address and port number of the corresponding database, 
and color of the label for display. The details of each field for the 
advisory label information is given below. 
1. Security levels: This is the advisory label for the security level of 
the IDS database, e.g., SIM_UNCLASSIFIED. 
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2. Binary representation: This is a numerical value assigned to an 
advisory label to determine its dominance relation, e.g., 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED and SIM_SECRET are assigned the value 
0 and 2, respectively. 
3. IP address: The IP address of the SQL database to connect to. 
4. Port number: The port number of the SQL database to connect 
to. 
5. Color: The color that the label would be displayed in at the start 
and end of that section. 
• There is only one configuration file for BASE per system. The MAC 
and DAC permissions (in the form of MAC:DAC) for this file is set to 
syslo:madmin.admin.0644. This file cannot be modified by BASE 
during runtime. 
• The execution of a STOP kernel call to extract the user’s current 
session level. 
• Advisory labels encapsulate the data displayed at each sensitivity 
level, as shown in Figure 12. 
• If multiple IDS data with different security levels are selected for 
display, the data will be presented in separate sections, in the 
increasing order of security level, as shown in Figure 12. 
• When a link in a particular section of a security level is selected, only 
the data related to that security level is presented in the new page in 
the same browser window. Advisory labels will also encapsulate 
requested data on the new page that BASE creates. All links within a 




Figure 12.   BASE displaying data with two security levels 
Figure 13 displays the logic used to determine which advisory labels are to 
be added to the header of the BASE display. A STOP system call is first made to 
obtain the current user’s session level (returned in ASCII string format), and 
saved for later use. The entries of advisory label information are then obtained 
from the configuration file and the binary representation of current session level 
is extracted by finding the matching security level string in those entries. This 
binary representation is then compared to all the mapping binary representation 
values contained in the entries. If the binary representation of the advisory label 
dominates the mapping binary representation value, the corresponding advisory 
label is added to the display. Otherwise, the advisory label is ignored. Once all 
the advisory labels have been compared, the header display is completed. 
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Figure 13.   BASE header logic 
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Figure 14.   BASE data presentation logic 
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Figure 14 shows the logic used to query and present IDS data on the web 
browser. The shaded boxes show the changes to the display logic. The logic for 
the code is repeated based on the dominance relation of the labels. If the display 
checkbox for an advisory label that the current session level dominates is 
checked, it will read the connection parameters (IP address and port number), 
connect to the corresponding database, display the advisory label marking the 
start of the displayed data block, the data returned from the database and is 
completed with the second advisory label. The process is repeated for the each 
subsequent label dominated by the current session until there are no more 
labels. 
D. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED 
This section discusses some of the known problems with the current 
implementation and the problems encountered that were solved. 
1. Issues With Current Implementation 
In the current implementation, the BASE application will always perform a 
connection to the IDS database through the proxy before a query. As the 
connection to a lower level classification database is now allowed due to the 
database proxy, this leads to a potential covert channel using the connection 
requests. A malicious program could be used to cause the BASE application to 
connect to a database at timed intervals, resulting in a timing covert channel.  
2. Solved Issues 
Enabling automatic updates to the event cache require a write operation to 
the BASE-specific database. This would mean that if multiple IDS databases of 
varying security levels were accessed, this write operation would be performed 
on all the databases. As a write-down to the databases of lower security level is 
not allowed, this would result in the premature termination of the display due the 
error messages. A solution was to disable the automatic updates option in the 
configuration file. However, that results in the user having to manually perform 
 41
the update in order to view the new alerts. The updates to the databases of the 
lower security levels would also result in error messages as writing down is not 
permitted, causing a premature termination of the display.  
A partial solution to this issue was to allow automatic updates to the event 
cache if the user’s current session level is equal to security level of the database. 
Automatic updates to the event cache are not permitted if the security level of the 
database is lower than the user’s current session level. To see if the event cache 
for the lower level database is updated, the user has to click on the “Cache & 
Status” link to display the cache status on a new web page. If the cache is not 
updated, the total number of events listed under “Alert Information Cache” will not 
tally with the cached events. Clicking on “Update Alert Cache” will cause an error 
as writing down is now permitted. 
 
Figure 15.   BASE event cache 
In order to update the event cache, a modified concept of operations is 
required. The user has to log out of the current session level and log in at the 
level of the database with the event cache to be updated. The user then has to 
login to the BASE application, which will automatically update the event cache. 
The user can then log out of this session level and log in to the previous level, 








With the implementation of PGPool-II as the database proxy and 
modification of BASE, the no read-up and no write-down MAC policy is enabled. 
The reports generated from different security levels of IDS databases can also 
consolidated and displayed in a single page. The next chapter describes the 
developmental and acceptance tests performed to ensure that the modifications 









This chapter describes the development and acceptance test plans 
designed to verify that the newly implemented database proxy and modified 
BASE functions properly. The results of the tests conducted are also presented. 
A. OVERVIEW 
Eleven systems were utilized during testing: the MYSEA server that hosts 
the database proxy, the modified BASE and the IDS databases, a Fedora Linux 
system as the Server Gateway, three Fedora Linux systems as the TPEs, three 
clients equipped with a web browser, two servers running the IDS and an 
attacker machine, which will simulate attack traffic for the IDS. Figure 16 shows 
the setup of the test environment. Different clients are used to demonstrate that 
the BASE display will be the same regardless of the platform used. Each 
individual client will connect to the MYSEA Server through its TPE and the 
gateway server. 
 
Figure 16.   Test setup 
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The developmental and acceptance test plans and results in this chapter 
are only discussed at a general level; the detailed test procedures are 
documented in Appendix C. 
B. DEVELOPMENTAL TESTING 
The purpose of developmental testing is to test the functionality of each of 
the components of the database proxy and BASE that were implemented or 
modified as part of this thesis. Sample data in the IDS databases are used in this 
part of the testing. 
1. PGPool-II Test Plan 
The purpose of this test suite is to verify that the modified PGPool-II proxy 
correctly handles the connection to and query requests to the IDS databases. 
The web browser on the client machine is used to connect and query the IDS 
databases through BASE. 
The tests are performed by trying to connect to the IDS databases at 
levels equal to, higher than and lower than the user’s current session level. To 
perform the tests individually, the configuration file for BASE is modified such that 
it only has single level access. This is needed because  using an unmodified 
configuration file will not allow tests that attempt to access databases at higher 
levels, such as the connect up test case (Test A7). The read and write queries to 
different security levels of the IDS databases are also tested. The test cases are 










Test Type Action Expected Result 
A1 Connect equal Connect to IDS database 
with security level equal 




A2 Read equal Read request sent to the 
IDS database with a 
security level equal to 
that of the user’s session 
level 
Successful read 
query with results 
returned 
A3 Write equal Write request sent to the 
IDS database with a 
security level equal to 




A4 Connect down Connect to the IDS 
database with a security 
level less than that of the 
user’s session level 
Connection 
successful 
A5 Read down Read request sent to the 
database with a security 
level less than that of the 
user’s session level 
Successful read 
query with results 
returned 
A6 Write down Write request sent to the 
IDS database with a 
security level less than 
that of the user’s session 
level 
Unsuccessful write 
query with error 
message returned. 
A7 Connect up Connect to the IDS 
database with a security 
level higher than that of 





Reload PGPool-II using 
incorrect IP address and 





Table 3.   Test cases for PGPool-II 
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An additional exception test case was also performed to determine if  
unauthorized applications could to connect to the IDS databases through 
PGPool-II. This test is described in Table 4. Applications not registered in the 
Remote Connection Database are not allowed access to the IDS databases. 
Test 
ID 
Test Type Action Expected Result 
B1 Unauthorized 
connection 





Table 4.   Exception test case for PGPool-II 
2. BASE Test Plan 
The purpose of this test suite is to verify that the modified BASE 
application correctly displays the user’s current session level as an advisory 
label. It should also display all the security levels that are dominated by the 
user’s current session level in the form of checkbox options. All the IDS data at 
each security level should be presented within sections marking the start and end 
of the IDS data of that security level. For this set of tests, BASE is set up as 
shown in Chapter III, Figure 4. The test cases are presented in Table 5. 
Test 
ID 
Test Type Action Expected Result 
C1 Login Display at 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
level 
Display login page  Advisory label of 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
is displayed. There is 
also only one option 
displayed for security 
level selection. 








Login Successfully.  
The main page is 
displayed with the 
advisory label of 
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SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
and the returned IDS 
data. There is also 
only one option 
displayed for security 
level selection. 
Advisory labels are 
placed at the start and 
end of the displayed 
IDS data section. 
C3 Page Navigation for 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
Click on a link A new page is 
displayed in the same 
window, showing the 
query results of the 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
database. Advisory 
labels are placed at 
start and end of the 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
IDS data.  
C4 Login Display at 
SIM_SECRET level  
Display login page Advisory label of 
SIM_SECRET is 
displayed. There are 
also only two options 
(SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
and SIM_SECRET) 
displayed for security 
level selection. 





Main page is 
displayed.  
Advisory Label of 
SIM_SECRET is 
displayed with the 
returned IDS data. 
Advisory labels are 
placed at the start and 
end of the displayed 
SIM_SECRET IDS 
data. 





Advisory labels for 
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checkboxes  are 
checked and click on 
the “Go” button. 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
and SIM_SECRET 
data are placed at the 
start and end of each 
section. 
C7 Lower level data only Ensure that only the 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
checkbox is checked 





checked. Only the 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
data is displayed and 
advisory labels for 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
data are placed at the 
start and end of the 
IDS data section. 
C8 Page Navigation - 
SIM_SECRET 
Click on a link in the 
SIM_SECRET 
section of the data. 
The resulting page will 
be displayed in the 
same window, 
showing only the 
SIM_SECRET data. 
The corresponding 
advisory labels are 
placed at the start and 
end of the IDS data 
section. 
C9 Page Navigation 
(SIM_SECRET) 
Click on a link in the 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
section of the data. 
The resulting page will 
be displayed in the 
same window, 




advisory labels are 
placed at the start and 
end of the IDS data 
section. 
 
Table 5.   BASE test cases 
For the second set of tests, BASE is configured to connect directly to the 
IDS databases without using the database proxy as shown in Figure 17. The test 
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cases presented in Table 6 are used to verify that read-down is not allowed if 
BASE is misconfigured to connect directly to the IDS databases or with incorrect 
parameters to the database proxy. The SSS Child performs the enforcement to 
prevent BASE from reading down. 
 





Test Type Action Expected Result 
D1 Connect equal Login at 
SIM_SECRET and 
connect to the 
SIM_SECRET IDS 
database 
Advisory label of 
SIM_SECRET is 
displayed. 
The SIM_SECRET IDS 
data is displayed on the 
main page. 
D2 Connect down Connect to the 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
IDS database 
Advisory label of 
SECRET is still displayed. 
Only the 
“UNCLASSIFIED” 
checkbox is checked. An 
error message showing 
that it cannot connect to 
the UNCLASSIFIED 
database is displayed. 
D3 Incorrect 
parameters 
Set the IP address 
and port number of 
database to connect 
to values not 
belonging to PGPool-
II or IDS database  
An error message 
showing that it cannot 
connect to the database is 
displayed. 
 
Table 6.   Test cases for BASE without proxy 
C. DEVELOPMENTAL TESTING RESULTS 
Developmental testing of PGPool-II did not reveal any unforeseen 
problems. It was able to allow connections from clients with session levels that 
dominate the security level of the IDS databases and deny those that do not 
dominate. For clients with session levels that dominate the security level of the 
IDS databases, PGPool-II was able to allow read access. PGPool-II was able to 
deny write access to clients whose session levels are not equal to the security 
level of IDS databases. For the exception testing, PGPool-II was also able to 
deny access to unauthorized applications such as psql. 
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Developmental testing of BASE was also completed successfully. The 
advisory label of the current session level is always displayed. The checkboxes 
displayed levels that are dominated by the current session level. Advisory labels 
are also displayed at the start and end of each IDS data block, indicating the 
security level of the data displayed in that section. The tests also demonstrate 
that BASE is unable to connect to an IDS database with a lower security level if it 
configured to connect to the IDS databases directly. 
D. ACCEPTANCE TESTING 
The goal of acceptance testing is to verify that the implemented PGPool-II 
and BASE application are able display “live” IDS alerts generated by IDS 
machines using attack traffic from the simulated attacker machine. This updated 
data should be presented when the web page is refreshed. Multiple clients 
should also be able to access the different IDS databases at the same time. The 
test cases are presented in Table 7. 
Test 
ID 
Test Type Action Expected Result 
E1 Updates to 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
IDS database while 
logged in at session 
level of 
SIM_SECRET 
Refresh web page The SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
section should display the 
IDS data that is not 
updated. 
E2 Updates to 
SIM_SECRET IDS 
database while 
logged in at session 
level of 
SIM_SECRET 
Refresh web page The SIM_SECRET 
section should display the 
updated IDS data. 
E3 Updates to 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
Refresh web page The SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
section should display the 
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IDS database while 
logged in at session 
level of 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
updated IDS data. 
E4 View the now 
updated 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
data while logged in 
at session level of 
SIM_SECRET 
Login. Ensure that 
the 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
checkbox is checked 
and click on the “Go” 
button.  
The SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
section should now 
display the updated IDS 
data. 
E3 Multiple clients 
access 
Login in multiple 
clients at different 
security levels 
The web page of each 
client should display data 
relevant to its security 
level. 
 
Table 7.   Acceptance test cases 
E. ACCEPTANCE TEST RESULTS 
The results of the acceptance tests were successful, demonstrating that 
updated data can be displayed when an IDS generates new alerts. Multiple 
clients at different security levels can also access the different IDS databases at 
the same time. Together with the developmental tests, the acceptance tests have 
shown that the current implementation of PGPool-II and BASE meets the top-
level requirements described in Chapter III, Section D. Detailed test results are 







This chapter described the developmental tests performed on the PGPool-
II and BASE that were implemented and modified for this project, and the 
acceptance tests performed to ensure that the PGPool-II and BASE were able to 
interact within the MYSEA context to fulfill the top level requirements of this 
project. All the tests conducted were successful and the test outputs are provided 
in Appendix D. The next chapter concludes with a project summary and 
suggestions for future work. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This chapter covers some of the future work that could be done to improve 
the IDS and database proxy, and the conclusion for this thesis.  
A. FUTURE WORK 
Several issues arose from this work that suggest further study and 
research to resolve them. 
1. PGPool-II 
Whenever a connection request from the client is sent to PGPool-II, it will 
contact the Remote Connection database to perform a check to determine if the 
client’s session level is higher than or equal to the security level of the IDS 
database. If the client’s session level is higher than or equal to the security level 
of the IDS database, PGPool-II will forward the connection request to the IDS 
database. This connection request will always be performed before the BASE 
application issues a query. This gives rise to a potential covert channel using the 
connection requests for lower level classification databases. A malicious program 
could be used to cause the BASE application at a higher security level to connect 
or disconnect to a lower level IDS database at timed intervals. Another malicious 
program running at that lower level, could probe the database at timed intervals 
to determine if a connection between PGPool-II and the database exists. The 
malicious program running at that lower level could then extract some information 
based on the connection status, resulting in a timing covert channel. Further 
analysis should also be conducted to determine if storage channels exist. 
A possible solution to this is to maintain a continuous connection between 
PGPool-II and the corresponding IDS database. As PGPool-II will always be 
connected to the corresponding IDS database, the connections from the BASE 
application to the IDS database through PGPool-II cannot be used as a timing 
covert channel. This would eliminate the problem of a covert channel in this case. 
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2. BASE Event Cache 
In the current implementation, the automatic update to the event cache of 
the BASE-specific databases with the security levels lower than that of the user’s 
current session level is disabled, as it causes a premature termination of the 
display due to the error messages returned when attempting to perform a write-
down. As a result, the user is only able to view the updated data from the event 
cache of the BASE-specific database with the security level equal to that of the 
user’s current session level. He is only able to view the older data for the 
databases with the security level lower than that of the current session level. In 
order to update the event cache, the user has to log out of the current session 
level and log in at the session level where the update is required. He then has to 
log out and log in again at the previous session level to view the updated 
consolidated IDS data. 
This issue arose because of the way BASE is implemented. It redundantly 
stores commonly used information in its own table to reduce the processing time 
required to retrieve it from several Snort tables. A possible solution is to modify 
BASE to write the event cache of all databases that BASE can query to the 
existing table, acid_event, in the database running at the level equal to the 
current session level. This can be done by adding an additional field as shown in 
Table 8 to indicate the security level of that event. 
Security Level BASE Event Table Information 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED Alert 1 information 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED Alert 2 information 
SIM_SECRET Alert 3 information 
SIM_SECRET Alert 4 information 
 
Table 8.   Additional field to BASE event cache table 
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Another possible solution is to implement addition event cache tables for 
each security level dominated by the security level of the database. However, 
this is not as scalable as the previous solution as additional tables have to be 
added at various security levels if the security level list grows. 
3. BASE Advisory Labels 
The set of advisory labels used by the BASE application is currently 
maintained in the BASE configuration files. The MYSEA server also maintains a 
separate set of advisory labels. If the label list in the MYSEA server grows, or if 
other labels for integrity or compartments are added, the set of advisory labels in 
the BASE configuration files would have to be updated to reflect these changes. 
Inconsistencies may arise if the set of advisory labels for the MYSEA server and 
BASE are not synchronized. Instead of having to maintain a separate set of 
advisory labels in the BASE configuration files, the BASE application could be 
modified to extract them from the MYSEA server. This would prevent 
inconsistencies in the label sets between BASE and the MYSEA server. 
Changes to the label set in the MYSEA server may be required in order to 
provide the mapping between the label and the corresponding binary 
representation. 
4. IDS Improvements 
Snort is the current choice of IDS for the MYSEA environment. However, 
Snort is single-threaded and thus, is able to look at only one packet at a time. 
Suricata, on the other hand, is multi-threaded, which allows it to concurrently 
inspect multiple network packets. This improves the chances of detecting attack 
traffic. While the current performance of Suricata is not up to par with Snort [10], 
development is ongoing to improve it. Further analysis should be done to 





The following questions were asked at the start of this thesis. 
1. Can a trusted mechanism be designed that will permit operators to 
read intrusion detection information at multiple classification levels 
while enforcing the system’s overall mandatory confidentiality policy? 
2. The SQL database allows both read and write access when 
connected. Can the designed trusted mechanism restrict write access 
when a user at a higher security level connects to a database of a 
lower security level? 
This thesis has addressed the two questions with the design and 
implementation of a database proxy and BASE modification. The database proxy 
mediates the access between the BASE application and the IDS databases to 
enforce the system’s overall mandatory confidentiality policy. The database proxy 
prevents the BASE application from reading up and writing down while the 
modifications to the BASE application would allow operators to view intrusion 
detection information at multiple classification levels within a single web page.  
The MYSEA project aims to provide a distributed multilevel secure 
operating environment that allows authenticated users to access data as 
permitted by the mandatory access control policy enforced by the MYSEA MLS 
server. With the design and implementation of the database proxy, it has been 
extended to provide “IDS read-down” capability to allow the system security 
analysts to obtain a more integrated view of the IDS alerts. This extension lays 







APPENDIX A.  SOURCE CODE LISTING 
This appendix provides a listing of the BASE source code files that were 
created or modified for this project. The files that were modified for this project 
are indicated with an asterisk. All these files reside on the MYSEA server. 
The following file generates the header information, which includes the 
advisory label, checkbox options as shown in Figure 13 in Chapter IV. 
base_mysea.php 
The following files were modified to include the BASE data presentation 
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APPENDIX B.  INSTALLATION PROCEDURES 
This appendix outlines the installation procedures for installing PGPool-II 
on Fedora 12 and MYSEA, and BASE on MYSEA. 
A. PGPOOL-II INSTALLATION ON FEDORA 12 
This section covers the installation of PGPool-II and PostgreSQL on 
Fedora 12. PostgreSQL has to be installed first as PGPool-II requires a library 
file from PostgreSQL. The setup is as shown in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18.   PGPool-II setup on Fedora 12 
1. PostgreSQL Installation 
1. Download PostgreSQL 8.4.4 from www.postgres.org to obtain the 
tar file postgresql-8.4.4.tar to the folder /home/Student/Downloads 
2. Root access is required for the following steps. To get root access, 
first launch the Terminal and type the following: 
 su 
 Password: <root password> 
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3. Copy the tar file to /usr/local/src and install PostgreSQL by typing 
the following commands 
 cp /home/Student/Downloads/postgresql-8.4.4.tar 
/usr/local/src 
 cd /usr/local/src 
 tar –xvf postgresql-8.4.4.tar 
 cd postgresql-8.4.4 
 ./configure 
 make 
 make install 
4. As only the library files from PostgreSQL are required, no further 
configuration is necessary and the installation for PostgreSQL is 
complete. 
2. PGPool-II Installation 
1. Download PGPool-II 2.3.3 from pgfoundry.org/projects/pgpool/ to 
obtain the tar file pgpool-II-2.3.3.tar to the folder 
/home/Student/Downloads 
2. At the same Terminal, copy the tar file to /usr/local/src and install 
PGPool-II by typing the following commands 
 cp /home/Student/Downloads/pgpool-II.2.3.3.tar 
/usr/local/src 
 cd /usr/local/src 
 tar –xvf pgpool-II.2.3.3.tar 




 make install 
3. As the test setup requires two instances of PGPool-II, two copies of 
the configuration files are required.  
 cp /usr/local/etc/pgpool.conf.sample 
/usr/local/etc/pgpool_unclassified.conf 
 cp /usr/local/etc/pgpool.conf.sample 
/usr/local/etc/pgpool_secret.conf 
4. Configure the pgpool_unclassified.conf located at /usr/local/etc/ 
pgpool_unclassified.conf. Configure the parameters so that they 
look like the following: 
 listen_addresses = ‘*’ 
 port = 9999 
 pcp_port = 9898 
 pid_file_name=’/var/run/pgpool/pgpool_unclassifie
d.pid’ 
 backend_hostname0 = ‘192.168.100.140’ 
 backend_port0 = 5433 
5. Configure the pgpool_secret.conf located at /usr/local/etc/ 
pgpool_secret.conf. Configure the parameters so that they look like 
the following: 
 listen_addresses = ‘*’ 
 port = 9998 
 pcp_port = 9897 
 pid_file_name=’/var/run/pgpool/pgpool_secret.pid’ 
 backend_hostname0 = ‘192.168.101.140’ 
 backend_port0 = 5434 
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6. Start the two instances of PGPool-II with the following commands 
 pgpool –f /usr/local/etc/pgpool_unclassified.conf 
&  
 pgpool –f /usr/local/etc/pgpool_secret.conf & 
7. To verify that both instances are started, type 
 ps –ef | grep pgpool 
 There should be two entries in the output, which correspond to: 
 pgpool –f /usr/local/etc/pgpool_unclassified.conf 
and 
 pgpool –f /usr/local/etc/pgpool_secret.conf 
To test the connection to the IDS databases, start up psql in 
/usr/local/pgsql/bin 
 cd /usr/local/pgsql/bin 
 To connect to the SIM_UNCLASSIFIED IDS database 
 ./psql –h localhost –p 9999 –U snort 
 Password for user snort: <snort password> 
 At the display prompt, type 
 snort=> select * from acid_event; 
 The results of the query should be displayed. Note the number  
 of rows then quit psql. 
 snort=> \q 
 Next connect to the SIM_SECRET IDS database 
 ./psql –h localhost –p 9998 –U snort 
 Password for user snort: <snort password> 
 At the display prompt, type 
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 snort=> select * from acid_event; 
 The results of the query should be displayed. Note the number 
 of rows. The number of rows should be different. This proves that both 
 instances of PGPool-II are able to connect to the two different IDS 
 databases. 
 Quit the psql application by typing 
 snort=> \q 
B. PGPOOL-II AND BASE INSTALLATION ON STOP 7 
This section covers installation of the modified PGPool-II and BASE on 
MYSEA running the STOP 7 OS. The IDS databases are assumed to be running 
already. 
1. MYSEA Server Setup 
The general steps to set up the MYSEA server are as follows: 
1. Get all the source code from the MYSEA Configuration 
Management archive. 
2. Perform the standard procedures for MYSEA installation and 
customize the network settings. 
3. Customize the MYSEA server with PostgreSQL installation, 
PGPool-II installation, PHP (with PostgreSQL support) and 
backend port configurations to support the database proxy. 
The detailed installation procedures can be obtained from "MYSEA 
Database Proxy Prototype Installation Manual, Version 1.0, November 2010" 
[16]. 
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2. BASE Installation 
This section assumes that no MYSEA server processes are currently 
running. The steps to install the BASE application on the MYSEA server is as 
follows: 
1. Remove the Default Route. 
 a. Login as ‘madmin’ user with password ‘<madmin password>’ 
 b. Get the required privilege for making changes 
 sec_label –p –l admin,all_exempt 
 c. Modify MYSEA route file (comment out default route) 
 vi /xts/etc/startup.d/20-routes 
 Modify the line 
 route add 0.0.0.0/0 192.168.0.254 to 
 #route add 0.0.0.0/0 192.168.0.254 
 e. Reboot the system for the changes to take effect 
 shutdown -r 
2. Copy the modified BASE Application into the MYSEA server. 
Obtain a CISR CM archive “Thesis-Ang-2010” CD containing the 
MYSEA_BASE.tar tarball, The following assumes that the CD 
device on the STOP 7.2.1 VM is on /dev/hdb. 
 a. Login as ‘madmin’ user with password ‘<madmin password>’ 
 b. Get the required privilege for making changes 
 sec_label –p –l admin,all_exempt,m_priv_macdac  
 c. Mount the CD device. 
 mount –r /dev/hdb /mnt/cdrom 
 d. Copy MYSEA_BASE.tar to the /home/madmin/mysea directory. 
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 cp /mnt/cdrom/MYSEA_BASE.tar /home/madmin/mysea 
 e. Copy the PGPool-II test configuration files to /local/mysea/conf  
  directory. 
 cp /mnt/cdrom/pgpool*.wrong /local/mysea/conf 
 f. Modify the PGPool-II test configuration files permission. 
 sec_label –l m_user_obj:syslo:madmin.m_sys.0444 
/local/mysea/conf/pgpool*.wrong 
 g. Unmount the CD device. 
 umount /mnt/cdrom 
3. Install the modified BASE application. 
 a. Extract the modified BASE application into the    
  /home/madmin/mysea/server/home_http_data/htdocs directory. 
 tar -C 
/home/madmin/mysea/server/home_http_data/htdocs -xvf 
/home/madmin/mysea/MYSEA_BASE.tar 
 b. Remove the ids_demo/setup directory: 
 rm -rf 
/home/madmin/mysea/server/home_http_data/htdocs/ids_demo/se
tup 
 c. Go to /home/madmin/mysea/server directory and run the   
  make_data_tar script. 
  cd /home/madmin/mysea/server 
 ./make_data_tar 
 d. Go to /home/madmin/mysea/server/scripts directory and run the  
  mysea_datainst.sh script. 
  cd /home/madmin/mysea/server/scripts 
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 ./mysea_datainst.sh 
 When prompted, enter '1' for TWiki Data Demo 
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APPENDIX C.  TEST PROCEDURES 
This appendix documents the test procedures used in the Test Plan 
presented in Chapter V. The test network should be set up as shown in Figure 19 
before testing.  
 
Figure 19.   Detailed test setup 
The server gateway, TPEs and the clients (in the left dotted box) are 
part of the standard MYSEA setup and thus, their setup is not discussed here. 
The setup of the IDS and attacker machines can be found in Appendix B of 
Tenhunen’s thesis [3]. For the setup of the MYSEA server, refer to Section B of 
Appendix B. 
As the numbers of machines are limited, Virtual Machines (VMs) are 
used in the place of actual machines. The following steps are then performed. 
1. Power up all the systems in the test network. 
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2. Start MYSEA Server VM (MYSEA-Server-IDS-STOP 7.2.1) 
 Note: <SAK> is <Alt> + <SysRq/PrintScreen> 
 a. <SAK> 
 b. Login as ‘madmin’, password is ‘‘<madmin password>’ 
 c. Go to ‘/local/mysea/scripts’ 
 cd /local/mysea/scripts 
 d. Start MYSEA daemons 
 ./mysea_start_daemon.sh 8000 
 e. Start the PostgreSQL databases 
 ./start_postgres.sh SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
 ./start_postgres.sh SIM_SECRET 
 f. Start PGPool-II 
 ./start_pgpool.sh 
3. Start Snort on IDS1 (Debian4.0 – IDS1 VM) 
 a. Login as ‘root’, password is ‘‘<root password>’ 
 b. Start snort: 
 snort -u snort -g snort -c /etc/snort/snort.conf 
&> ids1_test1.txt 
4. Start Snort on IDS2 (Debian4.0 – IDS VM) 
 a. Login as ‘root’, password is ‘‘<root password>’ 
 b. Start snort: 
 snort -u snort -g snort -c /etc/snort/snort.conf 
&> ids2_test1.txt 
5. Start the IDS Wakeup: Debian4.0 – idswakeup VM 
 71
 a. Login in with username ‘mdemo1’ and password ‘<mdemo1  
  password>’. 
 b. Start the ‘root’ terminal located on the desktop and enter   
  ‘<root password>’ as the password. 
6. Connect the Server Gateway VM to MYSEA Server 
 a. Login as ‘root’, password is ‘‘<root password>’ 
 b. Open a terminal window (located on desktop) 
 c. Change directory to /root/mysea/bin 
 cd /root/mysea/bin 
 d. Restart DSS configuration 
 ./dss_restart 
 e. Register DSS Client: 
 ./dss_client 192.168.0.140 
7. Connect the TPE1 VM 
 a. Login as ‘root’, password is ‘‘<root password>’ 
 b. Open a terminal window (located on desktop) 
 c. Change directory to /root/mysea/bin 
 cd /root/mysea/bin 
 d. Restart DSS configuration 
 ./dss_restart 
 e. Register DSS Client: 
 ./dss_client 192.168.0.140 
 f. Open another terminal window and type 
 cd /root/mysea/bin 
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 g. Start the TPE 
 ./tcbe.py 
 h. Click on the ‘SAR’ button 
 i. Enter ‘mdemo1’ as the user name 
 j. Enter ‘‘<mdemo1 password>’ as the password 
 k. Click on the ‘SAR’ button. Enter the command ‘sl’ 
 Enter session level as ‘SIM_SECRET’ 
 l. Click on ‘SAR’ button. Enter the command ‘run’. Wait for the  
 “RUN command completed” message to be displayed. 
8. On the Windows XP system,  
 a. Launch the web browser (Internet Explorer) 
 b. Browse default MYSEA Server page at 
 http://mlsserver.cisrlabmlstestbed1.com 
 The advisory label displayed should be ‘SIM_SECRET’. 
 c. Browse to BASE login page 
 http://mlsserver.cisrlabmlstestbed1.com/ids_demo/index.php 
 
A. PGPOOL-II TEST PROCEDURES 
At the STOP 7 prompt, navigate to /home/http/htdocs/ids_demo. 
cd /home/http/htdocs/ids_demo 
The test procedures are as follows: 
1. For test cases A1 and A2, use the configuration file stored in the 
directory navigated to by doing: 
 cp base_conf.php.a-equal base_conf.php 
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2. On the Windows XP system, refresh the BASE login page on the 
web browser. 
3. Perform the actions listed for test cases A1 and A2 
4. On the STOP 7 OS, use the base_conf.php.a-equal2 file. This file 
sets the ‘$event_cache_auto_update’ parameter to 1, which 
causes BASE to perform a write query to the IDS database. 
 cp base_conf.php.a-equal2 base_conf.php 
5. Generate traffic on the IDS Wakeup: Debian4.0 – idswakeup VM 
 a. Generate alert traffic for the SIM_UNCLASSIFIED network 
 idswakeup 192.168.100.50 192.168.100.140 
 b. Generate alert traffic for the SIM_SECRET network 
 idswakeup 192.168.101.50 192.168.101.140 
6. On the Windows XP VM, browse to the BASE login page again and 
then perform the actions specified in A3. 
7. On the STOP 7 VM, overwrite the ‘base_conf.php’ file with the 
‘base_conf.php.a-readdown’ file. 
 cp base_conf.php.a-readdown base_conf.php 
8. On the Windows XP VM, browse to the BASE login page again. 
Login with username as ‘snort’ and password as ‘<snort 
password>’. Ensure that the SIM_UNCLASSIFIED checkbox is 
checked, and the SIM_SECRET checkbox is not and click on the 
‘Go’ button.  
9. Perform the actions specified in A4 and A5. 
10. Repeat step 7, followed by clicking on the “Go” button. Click on the 
“Cache and Status” link at the bottom of the web page. 
11. Perform the actions specified in A6. 
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12. Close the web browser on the Windows XP machine. 
13. On the STOP 7 VM, overwrite the ‘base_conf.php’ file with the 
‘base_conf.php.connectup’ file. 
 cp base_conf.php.connectup base_conf.php 
14. On the TPE1 VM, click on the ‘SAR’ button in the TPE window and 
enter the command ‘sl’. Enter ‘SIM_UNCLASSIFIED’ for the 
session level. 
15. Click the ‘SAR’ button again and enter the command ‘run’. Wait for 
the “Run command completed” message to be displayed. 
16. On the Windows XP VM, launch the Internet Explorer web browser. 
17. Browse to the MYSEA Server page at 
http://mlsserver.cisrlabmlstestbed1.com. The advisory label 
displayed should be ‘SIM_UNCLASSIFIED’. 
18. Browse to the BASE login page. The advisory label displayed 
should be ‘SIM_UNCLASSIFIED’. However, the underlying IP 
address and port number has been deliberately mis-configured to 
connect to the SIM_SECRET IDS database. 
19. Perform the actions specified in A7. 
20. On the STOP 7 VM, replace the ‘base_conf.php’ to the MYSEA 
settings. 
 cp base_conf.php.mysea base_conf.php 
21. Close the web browser on the Windows XP VM. 
22. On the TPE1 VM, click on the ‘SAR’ button in the TPE window and 
enter the command ‘sl’. Enter ‘SIM_SECRET’ for the session 
level. 
23. Click the ‘SAR’ button again and enter the command ‘run’. Wait for 
the “Run command completed” message to be displayed. 
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24. On the STOP 7 VM, terminate PGPool-II. 
 /local/mysea/scripts/stop_pgpool.sh 
25. Save the original configuration files first. 
 cp /local/mysea/conf/pgpool_SIM_UNCLASSIFIED.conf 
/local/mysea/conf/pgpool_SIM_UNCLASSIFIED.conf.orig 
 cp /local/mysea/conf/pgpool_SIM_SECRET.conf 
/local/mysea/conf /pgpool_SIM_SECRET.conf.orig 
26. Overwrite the PGPool-II configuration with files that are 
misconfigured. 




 cp /local/mysea/conf/pgpool_SIM_SECRET.conf.wrong 
/local/mysea/conf /pgpool_SIM_SECRET.conf 
 sec_label –p –l admin: 
27. Restart PGPool-II. 
 /local/mysea/scripts/start_pgpool.sh 
28. On the Windows XP VM, launch the web browser. 
29. Browse to the BASE login page and perform test A8. 
30. On the STOP 7 VM, restore the configuration files to their original 
settings. 





 cp /local/mysea/conf/pgpool_SIM_SECRET.conf.orig 
/local/mysea/conf /pgpool_SIM_SECRET.conf 
 sec_label –p –l admin: 
31. Stop and restart PGPool-II. 
 /local/mysea/scripts/stop_pgpool.sh 
 /local/mysea/scripts/start_pgpool.sh 




Test Type Action Expected Result 
A1 Connect equal Enter the username as 
‘snort’ and password as 
‘‘<snort password>’ 
Connection successful. The 
main page will be 
displayed. 
A2 Read equal This step continues from 
A1. No action required 
Main page is displayed 
without errors 
A3 Write equal Enter the username as 
‘snort’ and password as 
‘‘<snort password>’ 
Main page is displayed 
without errors. 
A4 Connect down Click on the “Go” button. Connection successful. The 
main page will be 
displayed. 
A5 Read down This step continues from 
A1. No action required 
Main page is displayed 
without errors 
A6 Write down Click on “Update Alert 
Cache” under “Alert 
Information Cache” in the 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
section. 
Main page is displayed with 
error message: “Database 
ERROR: server closed the 
connection unexpectedly.” 
A7 Connect up Enter the username as 
‘snort’ and password as 
Connection unsuccessful. 
The following error 
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‘‘<snort password>’ message is displayed “Error 




Enter the username as 
‘snort’ and password as 
‘<snort password>’ 
Connection unsuccessful. 
The following error 
message is displayed “Error 
(p) connecting to DB: 
snort@192.168.0.140:9998 
(The error page may take a 
while to load) 
 
For the exception test case, launch the Fedora 12 VM. Login with 
username ‘Student’ and password ‘<Student password>’. Open a terminal 
and navigate to /usr/local/pgsql/bin. 
cd /usr/local/pgsql/bin 
Perform the test case by typing the following in the prompt. 
./psql –h 192.168.0.140 –p 9999 –U snort 
and 
./psql –h 192.168.0.140 –p 9998 –U snort 
Both commands should return the result “psql: server closed the 
connection abnormally before or while processing the request. 
B. BASE TEST PROCEDURES 
The test procedures are as follows: 
1. At the STOP 7 prompt, navigate to /home/http/htdocs/ids_demo. 
 cd /home/http/htdocs/ids_demo 
2. In the same directory, overwrite the ‘base_conf.php’ configuration 
file with ‘base_config.php.mysea’. 
 cp base_conf.php.mysea base_conf.php 
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3. On the TPE1 VM, click on the ‘SAR’ button in the TPE window and 
enter the command ‘sl’. Enter ‘SIM_UNCLASSIFIED’ for the 
session level. 
4. Click the ‘SAR’ button again and enter the command ‘run’. Wait for 
the “Run command completed” message to be displayed. 
5. On the Windows XP VM, launch the Internet Explorer web browser. 
6. Browse to the MYSEA Server page at 
http://mlsserver.cisrlabmlstestbed1.com. The advisory label 
displayed should be ‘SIM_UNCLASSIFIED’. 
7. Browse to the BASE login page at: 
 http://mlsserver.cisrlabmlstestbed1.com/ids_demo/index.php 
8. Perform the actions listed in Test C1 to C3. Close the web browser 
after performing the actions. 
9. On the TPE1 VM, click on the ‘SAR’ button in the TPE window and 
enter the command ‘sl’. Enter ‘SIM_SECRET’ for the session 
level. 
10. Click the ‘SAR’ button again and enter the command ‘run’. Wait for 
the “Run command completed” message to be displayed. 
11. On the Windows XP VM, launch the Internet Explorer web browser. 
12. Browse to the MYSEA Server page at 
http://mlsserver.cisrlabmlstestbed1.com. The advisory label 
displayed should be ‘SIM_SECRET’. 
13. Browse to the BASE login page at: 
 http://mlsserver.cisrlabmlstestbed1.com/ids_demo/index.php 
14. Perform the actions listed in Test C4 to C7.  
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15. Ensure that both the SIM_UNCLASSIFIED and SIM_SECRET 
checkboxes  are checked and click on the “Go” button. Perform 
action listed in Test C8. 
16. Click on the ‘Home’ link. Perform action listed in Test C9. 




Test Type Action Expected Result 
C1 Login Display at 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
level 
No action required Advisory label of 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
is displayed. There is 
also only one option 
displayed for security 
level selection. 
C2 Login at 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
level 
Login with username 
‘snort’ and password  
‘<snort password>’ 
Login Successfully.  
The main page is 
displayed with the 
advisory label of 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED. 
There is also only one 
option displayed for 
security level 
selection. Advisory 
labels are placed at 
the start and end of 
the displayed IDS 
data section. 
C3 Page Navigation for 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED
Click on a link on the 
page. 
A new page is 
displayed on the same 
Window, showing the 




labels are placed at 
the start and end of 
the IDS data section 
C4 Login Display at 
SIM_SECRET level  
No action required Advisory label of 
SIM_SECRET is 
displayed. There are 
also only two options 
(SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
and SIM_SECRET) 
displayed for security 
level selection. 
C5 Login at 
SIM_SECRET  
Login with username 
‘snort’ and password  
‘<snort password>’ 
Login Successfully. 
Main page is 
displayed.  
Advisory Label of 
SIM_SECRET is 
displayed 
C6 Data consolidation Ensure that both the 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
and SIM_SECRET 
checkboxes  are 
checked and click on 
the “Go” button. 
Both checkboxes 
remain checked. 
Advisory labels for 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
and SIM_SECRET 
data are placed at the 
start and end of each 
IDS data section. 
C7 Lower level data only Ensure that only the 
UNCLASSIFIED 
checkbox is checked 





checked. Only the 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
data is displayed and 
Advisory labels for 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
data are placed at the 
start and end of the 
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IDS data section. 
C8 Page Navigation at 
SIM_SECRET level 
Click on a link in the 
SIM_SECRET section 
of the data. 
The resulting page will 
be displayed in the 
same window, 
showing only the 
SIM_SECRET data. 
C9 Page Navigation at 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED
Click on a link in the 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
section of the data. 
The resulting page will 
be displayed in the 
same window, 




The test procedures for the second set of tests are as follows: 
1. At the STOP 7 prompt, navigate to /home/http/htdocs/ids_demo. 
 cd /home/http/htdocs/ids_demo 
2. In the same directory, overwrite the ‘base_conf.php’ configuration 
file with ‘base_config.php.direct’. The IP addresses and port 
numbers are configured to connect to the IDS databases directly. 
 cp base_conf.php.direct base_conf.php 
3. On the TPE1 VM, click on the ‘SAR’ button in the TPE window and 
enter the command ‘sl’. Enter ‘SIM_SECRET’ for the session 
level. 
4. Click the ‘SAR’ button again and enter the command ‘run’. Wait for 
the “Run command completed” message to be displayed. 
5. On the Windows XP VM, launch the Internet Explorer web browser. 
6. Browse to the MYSEA Server page at 
http://mlsserver.cisrlabmlstestbed1.com. The advisory label 
displayed should be ‘SIM_SECRET’. 
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7. Browse to the BASE login page at: 
 http://mlsserver.cisrlabmlstestbed1.com/ids_demo/index.php 
8. Perform the actions listed in Tests D1 and D2.  
9. On the STOP 7 VM, replace the ‘base_conf.php’ with 
‘base_conf.php.wrong’. 
 cp base_conf.php.wrong base_conf.php 
10. On the Windows XP VM, return to the BASE login page. Perform 
the action list in Test D3. Close the web browser when done. 
11. On the STOP 7 VM, restore the ‘base_conf.php’ to the original 
settings. 




Test Type Action Expected Result 
D1 Connect equal Ensure that only the 
SIM_SECRET 
checkbox is checked. 
Login with username 
‘snort’ and password  
‘<snort password>’ 
Advisory label of 
SIM_SECRET is 
displayed. 
The SIM_SECRET IDS 
data is displayed on the 
main page. 
D2 Connect down Uncheck the 
SIM_SECRET 
checkbox, check the 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
checkbox, and click on 
the “Go” button 
Advisory label of 
SIM_SECRET is still 
displayed. An error 
message showing that it 
cannot connect to the 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 




Login with username 
‘snort’ and password  
‘<snort password>’ 
An error message 
showing that it cannot 
connect to the database is 
displayed. 
 
C. ACCEPTANCE TEST PROCEDURES 
The test procedures for the acceptance tests are as follows: 
1. Connect the TPE2 VM 
 a. Login as ‘root’, password is ‘<root password>’ 
 b. Open a terminal window (located on desktop) 
 c. Change directory to /root/mysea/bin 
 cd /root/mysea/bin 
 d. Restart DSS configuration 
 ./dss_restart 
 e. Register DSS Client: 
 ./dss_client 192.168.0.140 
 f. Open another terminal window and type 
 cd /root/mysea/bin 
 g. Start the TPE 
 ./tcbe.py 
 h. Click on the ‘SAR’ button 
 i. Enter ‘mdemo2’ as the user name 
 j. Enter ‘<mdemo2 password>’ as the password 
 k. Click on the ‘SAR’ button. Enter the command ‘sl’ 
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 Enter session level as ‘SIM_UNCLASSIFIED’ 
 l. Click on ‘SAR’ button. Enter the command ‘run’. Wait for the  
 “RUN command completed” message to be displayed. 
2. Connect the TPE3 VM. The steps are the same as in Step 1 except 
at the following steps. 
 i. Enter ‘cudemo’ as the user name 
 j. Enter ‘<cudemo password>’ as the password 
 k. Click on the ‘SAR’ button. Enter the command ‘sl’ 
 Enter session level as ‘SIM_SECRET’ 
3. On the Windows XP VM, launch the Internet Explorer web browser. 
4. Browse to the MYSEA Server page at 
http://mlsserver.cisrlabmlstestbed1.com.  
5. Browse to the BASE login page at: 
 http://mlsserver.cisrlabmlstestbed1.com/ids_demo/index.php 
6. Login with username ‘snort’ and password ‘<snort 
password>’. 
7. Ensure that both the SIM_UNCLASSIFIED and SIM_SECRET 
buttons are checked and click on the “Go” button. Both sets of IDS 
data should be displayed on the web page. 
8. Generate traffic on the IDS Wakeup: Debian4.0 – idswakeup VM 
 a. Generate alert traffic for the SIM_UNCLASSIFIED network 
 idswakeup 192.168.100.50 192.168.100.140 
 b. On the web browser in the Windows XP VM, perform action  
  listed in Test E1. Return to the BASE main web page when done. 
 c. Generate alert traffic for the SIM_SECRET network 
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 idswakeup 192.168.101.50 192.168.101.140 
 d. Perform action listed in Test E2.  
9. Close the web browser on the Windows XP VM. 
10. On the TPE1 VM, 
 a. Click on the ‘SAR’ button. Enter the command ‘sl’ 
 Enter session level as ‘SIM_UNCLASSIFIED’ 
 b. Click on ‘SAR’ button. Enter the command ‘run’. Wait for the  
 “RUN command completed” message to be displayed. 
11. Repeat step 3 to 6, then repeat step 8a. 
12. Perform action listed in Test E3. Close the browser when done. 
13. Repeat step 10 to 11. Enter session level as ‘SIM_SECRET’ in step 
10a. In step 11, repeat step 8c instead of 8a. 
14. On the Windows XP VM, perform the action listed in Test E4. 
15. On both the two Knoppix Client VMs, launch the Firefox web 
browser. Repeat Steps 4 to 6. 




Test Type Action Expected Result 
E1 Updates to 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
IDS database while 
logged in at session 
level of 
SIM_SECRET 
Refresh web page. 
To see if there are 
updates to the 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
IDS database, click 
on the “Cache & 
Status” link at the 
bottom of the web 
page.  
The SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
section should display the 
IDS data that is not 
updated. 
When the “Cache & 
Status” link is clicked, the 
value for total number of 
events should be higher 
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than that of the event 
cache. 
E2 Updates to 
SIM_SECRET IDS 
database while 
logged in at session 
level of 
SIM_SECRET 
Refresh web page The SIM_SECRET 
section should display the 
updated IDS data. 
E3 Updates to 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
IDS database while 
logged in at session 
level of 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
Refresh web page The SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
section should display the 
updated IDS data. 
E4 View the now 
updated 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
data while logged in 
at session level of 
SIM_SECRET 
Login. Ensure that 
the 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
checkbox is checked 
and click on the “Go” 
button.  
The SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
section should now 
display the updated IDS 
data. 
E5 Multiple clients 
access 
View main web page Client 1 (Windows XP) 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED and 
SIM_SECRET data are 
displayed. 
Client 2 (Knoppix) 
Only 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
data is displayed. 
Client 3 (Knoppix) 





APPENDIX D.  TEST RESULTS 
This appendix presents the results of the development and acceptance 
tests performed in Appendix C. 
A. DEVELOPMENT TEST RESULTS 
This section covers the development test results for PGPool-II and the 
BASE application. 
1. PGPool-II Test Results 
The test results for PGPool-II are as follows: 
Test 
ID 
Test Type Expect Result Result (Pass/Fail)
A1 Connect equal Connection successful. The main 
page will be displayed. 
Pass 
A2 Read equal Main page is displayed without 
errors 
Pass 
A3 Write equal Main page is displayed without 
errors. 
Pass 
A4 Connect down Connection successful. The main 
page will be displayed. 
Pass 
A5 Read down Main page is displayed without 
errors 
Pass 
A6 Write down Main page is displayed with error 
message: “Database ERROR: 
server closed the connection 
unexpectedly.” 
Pass 
A7 Connect up Connection unsuccessful. The Pass 
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following error message is 




Connection unsuccessful. The 
following error message is 
displayed “Error (p) connecting to 
DB: snort@192.168.0.140:9998 




The result for the exception test case is as follows: 
Test 
ID 
Test Type Expected Result Result (Pass/Fail)
B1 Unauthorized 
connection 
Connection unsuccessful Pass 
 
2. BASE Test Results 
The results for the first test suite of BASE are as follows: 
Test 
ID 
Test Type Expected Result Result (Pass/Fail)
C1 Login Display at 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
level 
Advisory label of 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED is 
displayed. There is also 
only one option displayed 
for security level selection. 
Pass 
C2 Login at 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
level 
Login Successfully.  
The main page is 





There is also only one 
option displayed for 
security level selection. 
Advisory labels are placed 
at the start and end of the 
displayed IDS data 
section. 
C3 Page Navigation for 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
A new page is displayed 
on the same Window, 
showing the query results 
of the 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
database. Advisory labels 
are placed at the start and 
end of the IDS data section
Pass 
C4 Login Display at 
SIM_SECRET level  
Advisory label of 
SIM_SECRET is 
displayed. There are also 
only two options 
(SIM_UNCLASSIFIED and 
SIM_SECRET) displayed 
for security level selection. 
Pass 
C5 Login at 
SIM_SECRET  
Login Successfully. Main 
page is displayed.  
Advisory Label of 
SIM_SECRET is displayed 
Pass 
C6 Data consolidation Both checkboxes remain 
checked. Advisory labels 
for SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
and SIM_SECRET data 
are placed at the start and 
end of each IDS data 
section. 
Pass 
C7 Lower level data only The SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
checkbox remains 




is displayed and Advisory 
labels for 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED data 
are placed at the start and 
end of the IDS data 
section. 
C8 Page Navigation at 
SIM_SECRET level 
The resulting page will be 
displayed in the same 
window, showing only the 
SIM_SECRET data. 
Pass 
C9 Page Navigation at 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
The resulting page will be 
displayed in the same 





The results for the second test suite of BASE are as follows: 
Test 
ID 
Test Type Expected Result Result (Pass/Fail)
D1 Connect equal Advisory label of SIM_SECRET is 
displayed. 
The SIM_SECRET IDS data is 
displayed on the main page. 
Pass 
D2 Connect down Advisory label of SIM_SECRET is 
still displayed. An error message 
showing that it cannot connect to 
the SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 




An error message showing that it 





B. ACCEPTANCE TEST RESULTS 
The acceptance test results are as follows. 
Test 
ID 
Test Type Expected Result Result (Pass/Fail) 
E1 Updates to 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIE
D IDS database 
while logged in at 
session level of 
SIM_SECRET 
The SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
section should display the 
IDS data that is not updated.
When the “Cache & Status” 
link is clicked, the value for 
total events should be 
higher than that of the event 
cache. 
Pass 
E2 Updates to 
SIM_SECRET IDS 
database while 
logged in at session 
level of 
SIM_SECRET 
The SIM_SECRET section 
should display the updated 
IDS data. 
Pass 
 Updates to 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIE
D IDS database 
while logged in at 




section should display the 
updated IDS data. 
Pass 
 View the now 
updated 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIE
D data while logged 
in at session level of 
SIM_SECRET 
The SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
section should now display 
the updated IDS data. 
Pass 
E3 Multiple clients 
access 
Client 1 (Windows XP) 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED and 




Client 2 (Knoppix) 
Only SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
data is displayed. 
Client 3 (Knoppix) 
Same as Client 1 
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